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Abstract In this article the determinants of psychotic dis-
order and correlated free will is examined. Althought there is
empirical evidence for significant cognitive, emotional and
neurobiological correlates of psychosis the precise impact
of these abnornalities on free will is largely unclear. More
research is needed into a) the role of free will into psychotic
etiology and maintenance and b) the impact of different cat-
egories of psychotic disorder on free will of the patient.
Introduction
To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When
an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what
she does is up to her. She is an ultimate source or origin of
her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will (Clarke,
2003). The degree of free will will have significant impact
on the social, emotional and mental well-being/health, and
social-emotional and moral development of human beings
(Clarke, 2003). However, the real nature of free will and
its precise impact on and interactions with psychosocial,
emotional, neurobiological and intrapsychic functioning is
largely unknown.
The role of choice in the etiology of mental disorders is a
poor discovered area. When we study case reports of men-
tal disordered patients we can conclude that there is some
evidence that mental disorder in some psychiatric patients is
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a) a way of survival (Jaspers, 1963; Roberts, 1991; Strauss,
1991), and/or b) the result of personal choice which cor-
responds with a particular intrapsychic route to remission
(Martens, 2002a,b). The relationship free will and psychotic
disorder is examined in this article.
Definition of psychotic disorders
According the fourth edition diagnostic manual of mental
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) of the
American Psychiatric Association the category psychotic
disorders includes the following disorders:
 Schizophrenia—paranoid, disorganized, catatonic, undif-
ferentiated, residual type. Psychotic symptoms continue
for at least 6 months and are coupled with impairment of
social and occupational functioning;
 Schizophreniform disorder. Same criteria as schizophrenia
but the psychotic symptoms last from 1–6 months and there
is no social dysfunction;
 Schizoaffective disorder. Psychotic and mood distur-
bances:
 Delusional disorder. Delusions are defined as false, inac-
curate beliefs (for instance grandiose delusion in which the
persons importance is grossly out of proportion, or para-
noid delusions) the person holds onto even when he or she
is presented with accurate information;
 Brief psychotic disorder. Psychotic symptoms last between
1 and 30 days;
 Shared psychotic disorder. A delusion develops in an in-
dividual in the context of a close relationship with another
person(s), who has already-established delusion. The delu-
sion is similar in content to that of the person was already
has the established delusion;
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 Psychotic disorder due to a general medical condition delu-
sions;
 Psychotic disorder due to a general medical condition hal-
lucinations (visual and auditory hallucination are com-
mon);
 Psychotic disorders not otherwise specified. Prevalence of
hallucinations, delusions or disorganized speech or behav-
ior without meeting above-mentioned diagnosis.
Growing evidence suggests that symptoms of psychosis
may be a common end-state variety of disorders includ-
ing manic depression, borderline personality disorder and
schizophrenia; rather than a reflection of the specific eti-
ology of schizophrenia (Tsuang, Stone, & Faraone, 2000).
Psychotic disorders may be the product of (an interaction be-
tween) genetic and neurobiological factors on one hand and
psychosocial and environmental factors on the other (DSM-
IV, 2000; Gelder, Lopez-Ibor, & Andreasen, 2000; Kaplan
and Sadock, 1999).
Method of examination of free will in psychotic
individuals
In order to test the free will in psychotic patients I will utilze
a) an adapted version of the internal needs satisfaction list
(see Glasser, 1999) that is inspired on the choice theory, b)
Kane’s (2000) criteria of free will, c) Rollo May’s theory
(May, 1961, 1986/1987) that the patient’s ability to reveal-
ing and exploring of life’s deterministic forces leads to some
freedom and choice, and d) psychological and neurologic
empirical and theoretical studies into cognitive and emo-
tional correlates of etiology and maintenance of psychosis.
Rational choice theories hold that individuals must antic-
ipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and cal-
culate that which will be best for them. Rational individuals
choose the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest
satisfaction (Friedman & Hechter, 1990; Heath, 1976; Scott,
2000). These theories are build around the idea that all ac-
tion is fundamentally ‘rational’ in character and that people
calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before
deciding what to do. William Glasser (1999) contends that
all behavior is intended to satisfy one of the following five
internal needs:
1) To survive or (such as the author wants to define for his
purpose) to escape unbearable reality.
2) To belong and be loved by others.
3) To have power and importance.
4) To have freedom and independence.
5) To have fun. The relevance of this need for psychotic
development is questionable.
The author likes to add following relevant internal need:
6) The intrapsychic need to change and transformation.
According to Kane (2000) free will is characterized by
a) the condition of alternative possibilities or the power to
do otherwise; b) ultimate responsibility. A person must be at
least in part responsible by virtue of past voluntary choices
or actions for having a character and motives he or she now
has; c) efforts of the will or “Self-Forming Actions.” Is the
current condition or situation the result of conscious efforts
of the will?; d) plural voluntariness. They are both voluntary
and there is at least one alternative choice (Kane, 2000).
Rollo May (1986/1987) suggests and obserbed that in
the revealing and exploring of life’s deterministic forces,
the patient is orienting himself/herself in some particular
way to the data and thus is engaged in some choice and is
experiencing some freedom (May, 1986/1987).
Investigation into free will in psychotic patients
A) Fulfillment of internal needs
1) To survive or avoid unbrearable reality. It is hypothesized
by many professionals like Jaspers (1963) and Roberts
(1991) that psychosis is rather a manner to cope with un-
bearable circumstances, social-emotional and/or mental
problems. Strauss (1991) believes that people are con-
structors of their worlds, including intentionality, feelings,
meaning, and even development and self-regulation. The
author believes that psychotic disorder can also be con-
sidered as a self-regulation strategy which is intended to
handle or avoid stress, strong emotional reactions, diffi-
cult situations and to minimize undesirable psychosocial
influences.
2) To belong and be loved by others. Erotomania patients
create the fulfilment of this need by creating delusions of
being loved by another person (usually of a higher status
and it can be a complete stranger). The delusion concerns
idealized romantic love and spiritual union rather than
sexual attraction (APA, 2000).
3) To have power and importance. Patients (especially those
with high self-esteem; see Smith et al., 2006) who experi-
ence a serious lack of power and importance can “fulfill”
this lacuna by means of developing grandiose delusions.
4) To have freedom and independence. Some patients
who experience galling bonds, too heavy responsibili-
ties and/or obligation might free themselves by means of
creating freedom with help of psychotic development.
5) To have fun. The relevance of this need for psychotic
development appears nihil.
6) The intrapsychic need to change and transform. This
might be a very significant need since the psychotic pro-
cess can be regarded as a transformation via creative
chaos into a new mental and emotional balance (Martens,
2002a). Furthermore, Warmana & Martinb (2006)
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revealed (using Beck Cognitive Insight Scale) that those
patients who were higher in delusion proneness were
more open to external feedback and were more willing
to acknowledge fallibility than those who were lower in
delusion proneness (Self-Reflectiveness subscale of the
BCIS; p = .002). The author suggests that a higher degree
of openeness to feedback of other people and readiness
to test their beliefs in patients with increased delusion
proneness can be interpreteded as a correcting force and
internal compass that could guide them through the dis-
ease process. This might prevent or diminish excessive
and harmful delusional activities and it could prepare a
recovery process. Such an openess to the external world
is a sign that even high risk patients are not locked up
in their disorder and own microcosmos, but that they are
trying to free themselves.
B) Free will characteristics
The author speculates that it might be possible that some psy-
chotic patients meet Kane’s characteristic of free will (the
power to do otherwise; ultimate responsibility; self-forming
actions; plural voluntariness) when they a) are ready to and
motivated for change; b) demonstrate sufficient insight in
their disorder; c) demonstrate sufficient delusional-free mo-
ments; d) suffer from mild symptoms; e) show strong self-
correction and reality-testing capacities; f) show enough
cognitive and coping skills to handle their disease; g) re-
ceive effective therapeutic guidance and psychopharmaco-
logical medication; h) experience optimal psychosocial sup-
port; and/or i) when their life conditions are as much as
possible free from stress (because stress increases risk or
persistance of psychosis).
C) Patient’s ability to revealing and exploring of life’s
deterministic forces
Some psychotic patients are able (and demonstrate a strong
motivation) to reveal and explore their life’s determinis-
tic forces and to realize in this manner some freedom by
means of insight-oriented therapy (Karon, 2006; May, 1961,
1986/1987). This wish and ability to explore are significant
determinants of free will.
D) Cognitive and emotional abnormalities which correlate
with free will
Cognitive distortions
The idea that delusions often reflect an abnormal attitude
towards the self has a long history. Consistent with this
idea, the most common delusional themes—persecution
and grandiosity—seem to reflect individuals’ preoccupations
about their position in the social universe. Psycho-analysts
have interpreted persecutory delusions as the consequence
of defensive strategies that serve the function of protecting
the individual from negative perceptions of the self, and the
well-replicated finding of an abnormal style of explaining
negative events in paranoid patients seems consistent with
this idea (Bentall, 2003).
Empirical evidence demonstrate that mentalizing errors
(misunderstanding of beliefs, feelings, intentions, goals and
dispositions of others) (Moore et al., 2006; Craig, Hatton,
Craig, & Bentall, 2004) and of attributional style (style of
inferring the causes of important events) (Craig et al., 2004)
might contribute to the development and maintenance of
persecutory delusions. Theories have emphasized that early
experience, perceptual abnormalities, motivational factors,
and information-processing deficits (Bentall, Corcoran,
Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001), selectively
attend to threatening information, jump to conclusions
on the basis of insufficient information, attribute negative
events to external personal causes, and have difficulty in
envisaging others’ intentions, motivations, or states of mind
(Blackwood, Howard, Bentall, & Murray, 2001) play a
major role in the development and persistence of persecutory
delusions.
Blackwood et al. (2001) concluded after analyzing of rel-
evant neurologic investigations that the “reality distortion”
cluster of psychotic symptoms correlates with cerebral blood
flow in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, ventral striatum, su-
perior temporal gyrus, and parahippocampal region. Social
cognitive processing (selective attention to threat, attribu-
tion of causation or mental states) in normal subjects in-
volves similar areas (Blackwood et al., 2001). Blackwood
et al. (2004) revealed in their own neurologic study (func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging; fMRI) in schizophrenic
patients with persecutory delusions (n = 8) and normal con-
trols (n = 8) (while determining the self-relevance of am-
biguous self-relevant or unambiguous other-relevant neutral
and threatening statements) that abnormalities of cingulate
gyrus activation while determining self-relevance suggest
impaired self-reflection in the persecutory deluded state. This
may contribute to persecutory belief formation and mainte-
nance (Blackwood et al., 2004). Blackwood et al. (2000)
examined also 2 components of social cognition (attentional
and attributional biases) that contribute to the formation and
maintenance of paranoid delusions, using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI). 5 normal Ss (aged 28–36
yrs) performed tasks requiring attentional and attributional
judgements. The authors investigated the neural response
particularly associated with attention to threatening mate-
rial relevant to self and with the “self-serving” attributional
bias. The determination of relevance to self of verbal state-
ments of differing emotional valence involved left ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (left inferior frontal gyrus, BA 47),
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right caudate and right cingulate gyrus (BA 24). Attention
to threatening material relevant to self differentially acti-
vated a more dorsal region of the left inferior frontal gyrus
(BA 44). Internal attributions of events, where the self was
viewed as an active intentional agent, involved left precen-
tral gyrus (BA 6) and left middle temporal gyrus (BA 39).
Anomalous activity or connectivity within these defined re-
gions may account for the attentional or attributional biases
subserving paranoid delusion formation (Blackwood et al.,
2000).
Emotional correlates of etiology and maintenance
of psychosis
A cross-sectional investigation was conducted by Freeman,
Garety, and Kuipers (2001) on individuals (n = 25) with per-
secutory delusions. A detailed assessment was made of the
presence of safety behaviours, the content of delusions and
emotional distress. All participants had used at least one
safety behaviour in the last month, most typically avoidance.
Higher levels of anxiety were associated with greater use of
safety behaviours. New data were obtained on the content
of persecutory delusions. Aspects of the content of the delu-
sions were associated with levels of depression, self-esteem,
anxiety and delusional distress (Freeman et al., 2001). It is
argued that in many cases delusions are a direct representa-
tion of emotional concerns, and that emotion contributes to
delusion formation and maintenance. The content of halluci-
nations less often directly expresses the emotional concerns
of the individual, but emotion can trigger and contribute
to the maintenance of hallucinatory phenomena, although
how this occurs is not well understood. (Freeman & Garety,
2003).
Also in a cross-sectional analysis, Smith et al. (2006)
examined in patients (n = 100) who had suffered a recent
relapse in psychosis the role of depression, self-esteem and
negative evaluative beliefs in relation to specific positive
symptoms (persecutory delusions, auditory hallucinations
and grandiose delusions) and symptom dimensions (e.g.
distress, negative content, pre-occupation and conviction).
Analysis indicated that individuals with more depression
and lower self-esteem had auditory hallucinations of greater
severity and more intensely negative content, and were more
distressed by them. In addition, individuals with more de-
pression, lower self-esteem and more negative evaluations
about themselves and others had persecutory delusions of
greater severity and were more pre-occupied and distressed
by them (that will likely contribute to the maintenance of
delusions because risk factors provoke delusion and delusion
activate risk factors, and so on). The severity of grandiose
delusions was related inversely to depression scores and
negative evaluations about self, and directly to higher self-
esteem. (Smith et al., 2006).
In a study of Freeman et al. (2005a) a nonclinical popu-
lation (N = 327) completed measures of paranoia, anoma-
lous experiences (hallucinatory predisposition, perceptual
anomalies), emotion (depression, anxiety, self-focus, stress,
interpersonal sensitivity), and reasoning (need for closure).
Paranoia was best explained by separation anxiety, depres-
sion, fragile inner self, hallucinatory experiences, discomfort
with ambiguity, stress, self-focus, perceptual anomalies, and
anxiety. The findings are consistent with the central predic-
tions within the model of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005a).
A cognitive model of persecutory delusions was used by
Freeman et al. (2005b) to predict the occurrence of non-
clinical paranoid thoughts in a virtual reality environment.
Scorers across the range of paranoia entered a virtual reality
scene populated by five computer characters programmed to
behave neutrally (N = 30). Many appraisals of the computer
characters were positive or neutral. However, there were
also persecutory thoughts about the characters. Providing
evidence of the validity of the experimental method, perse-
cutory ideation was predicted by higher trait paranoia and a
greater sense of presence in the environment. The psycholog-
ical variables from the cognitive model that predicted per-
secutory ideation were anxiety, timidity, and hallucinatory
predisposition. Further, hallucinatory predisposition distin-
guished the prediction of paranoid thoughts from social anxi-
ety in virtual reality. It is concluded that nonclinical paranoid
thoughts are most closely associated with emotional distur-
bances and anomalous experiences. Extreme reasoning bias
may particularly contribute to the development of clinical
phenomena (Freeman et al., 2005b).
Participants (n = 100) with current delusions were as-
sessed baseline on measures of reasoning, emotions, and
dimensions of delusional experience by Garety et al. (2005).
Reasoning biases (belief inflexibility, jumping to conclu-
sions, and extreme responding) were found to be present
in one half of the sample. The hypothesis was confirmed
that reasoning biases would be related to delusional convic-
tion. There was evidence that belief inflexibility mediated
the relationship between jumping to conclusions and delu-
sional conviction. Emotional states were not associated with
the reasoning processes investigated. Anxiety, but not de-
pression, made an independent contribution to delusional
conviction (Garety et al., 2005).
Analysis of empirical data
Study data did not indicate if and how precisely cogni-
tive and/or emotional determinants of psychotic disorder
might interfere with free will. The analysed studies did
not provide explanations regarding the role of cognitive and
emotional abnormality in the complete scala of determina-
tions of delusions. Cognitive and emotional abnormailities
might often lead to psychosis when also psychosocial (lack
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of social support, a stressful environment; unemployment;
poor social-economical conditions), intrapsychic (instincts,
unconscious drives, defense, repression), and/or physical
conditions (diabetes melitis, obesitas, see Cohen, Piute,
Dekker, & Gispen-De Wied, 2003; sleep disorders and so on)
are involved. Investigations are needed which cover all these
relevant correlates of psychosis (and interactions between
them) in order to form a complete picture which is necessary
to understand the degree of impact of these correlates on
free will of the patients. Since emotional dysfunctions were
excluded in one study and cognitive distortions in another it
is unclear what percentage of the investigated patients suf-
fered (and in what degree) from one or more abnormalities
that were not examined in that particularly investigation,
but which were relevant to psychotic etiology. It extremely
difficult to interprete these study results, because of a lack
of precise and complete information about the seriousness,
duration, and fluctuations of abnormalities and other comor-
bidities, disorders or incapacities which might be relevant to
the assessment of psychosis and free will.
Some cognitive, emotional and/or neurobiological distor-
tions are only temporary or episodically and the patient in
question is able in his or her normal episodes to control
his or her life and to experience at least some freedom of
will. Strauss (1991) pointed out that delusions often appear
to start out as very normal or normal-appearing ideas, then
after an idea evolves into delusion, the delusion may fade
back more or less to normal again. Phenomenological stud-
ies show that delusional beliefs, like ordinary beliefs and
attitudes, vary across a number of dimensions such as their
bizarreness, the conviction with which they are held, the ex-
tent to which the patient is preoccupied by them, and the
extent to which they lead to distress. Over short periods of
time, the conviction with which delusional beliefs are held
may vary considerably, so that beliefs that are held to be
absolutely true on one day may be described as possibly true
only on the next. In the long term, however, the delusions
of psychotic patients often persist for many years (Bentall
et al., 2001). The formation, elaboration, and persistence
of delusional beliefs may be an expression of the conver-
gence of numerous causal influences, each exerting an effect
at a different stage in the evolution of the belief (Roberts,
1992). As a consequence the degree of free will of psychotic
patients will fluctuate during the disorder process. Never-
theless, there is some empirical evidence (see Warmana &
Martinb, 2006) that even patients with increased delu-
sion proneness demonstrate also increased correctional ten-
dencies (this will discussed later) compared with per-
sons with less delusion proneness. As a consequence
the author can conclude that even (or especially) high
risk patients are willing and able to test and cor-
rect their abnormal beliefs. This is an important sign
of striving for freedom even in patients with poor
prognosis.
Practical usefulness of these findings
Insight in the degree of free will in psychotic patients is
therapeutic very significant, because free choice (and as-
sociated ability to change) in combination with motivation
for change are important conditions for therapeutic success.
The patient’s ability a) to explore the determinating forces
in his life, b) to use alternative possibilities (in combina-
tion with ultimate responsibility, self-forming actions, and
plural voluntariness), c) cognitive and/or emotional func-
tioning, and d) patient’s ability to and motivation for explo-
ration of the deterministic forces of his or her life should
be assessed at several stages in the therapeutic process, be-
cause it correlated with free will and changeability of the
patient.
The prevalence of specific internal needs hat correlate with
psychosis in a particular psychotic patient can be assessed
with help of an instrument that is based on the choice theory
of Glasser (see Glasser, 1999; Sansone, 1998). Based on such
assessment a therapeutic program can be constructed that is
targeted towards fulfilling of these needs in a healthy and con-
structive way. In fact, negative and destructive mental and
emotional energy (that is intrapsychic driven by extreme fear
of reality and emotional suffering and that results in severe
social isolation, confusion, inadequate attitude and lifestyle)
in the patient should be transformed in positive en construc-
tive energy en goal settings. In fact, most psychotherapeutic
approaches are equipped for that task.
Following six internal basic needs could be fulfilled in an
alternative way:
1) To survive or to escape unbearable reality, and
2) to belong and be loved by others. In therapy and/or psy-
choeducational programs patients should encourage to
explain why they fear confrontation with reality. The
therapist can frequently provide some useful feedback
(patient’s fear is mostly unfounded or exaggerated) and
can try to convince the patient that cautious but solid
confrontation with reality (in his or her tempo) can
bring immense relief and benefits such as enhanced
self-esteem and self-knowledge, increased awareness of
social-emotional reality, and correlated increased possi-
bilities to social interactions and form bonds.
3) To have power and importance, and
4) to have freedom and independence. The therapist and/or
psycho-educator can reveal to the patient that the only
adequate manner to obtain importance, power, freedom
and independence is by means of reality testing. A healthy
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sense of reality is always required to realize these goals
in a satisfactory and lasting way.
5) To have fun (is not relevant).
6) The intrapsychic need to change and transform. This need
to change and transform might be fulfilled by means of
enhancement of self-insight and self-criticism, adequate
utilization of feedback from the outside world, reality-
testing and development of an effective transformation
strategy. The patient must learn to consider and experi-
ence psychotic disorder as a meaningful dynamical learn-
ing process that could result in a valuable experiences
and growth. In fact, this might be called the long road,
because the fragile healthy person who is unable to con-
tinue his or her life in a normal way (as a result of lack
of power, energy, hope and so on) takes the road from
normality to psychosis and back again to normality. How-
ever, this roundabout route offers the patient insight that
is crucial for his or her effective dealing with reality. The
psychotherapist can play a significant guiding role in this
complicated process.
Adequate therapeutic approach to enhance
the patient’s free will
The psychotic patient should indicate in the therapeutic pro-
cess when he or she is ready to change and/or to investigate
the motives for and profits from being psychotic. Only when
it is the patient’s wish to live without psychosis the thera-
pist should try to find together with the patient a way out of
his or her psychotic isolation. When a patient is motivated to
change it is suggested that “wish” and “will” must be viewed
as opposite but interdependent poles centering around free-
dom and consciousness, and that “decision” is the act in
which they are brought together (May, 1986/1987). In prac-
tical therapy the interrelations among them occur on 3 levels:
of awareness as wish, of self-consciousness as will, and of
responsibility as decision (May, 1961). In this way can the
patient increase and intensify his free will and associated
responsibility for his or her life.
Adequate use of the patient’s personal choice in the recov-
ery process is a very powerful instrument, because it might
lead to optimal activation of the patient’s creative, emotional
and will power, which is necessary for a fruitful transfor-
mation process. Growing choice abilities/opportunities are
often associated with a) advanced social-emotional and in-
trapsychic maturation and development (because enhanced
freedom might lead to exploration of new intrinsic and ex-
trensic areas) and b) intrapsychic experiences that give the
patient sufficient strength and optimism to take the diffi-
cult step to change attitude. It is the therapist’s difficult task
to offer powerful therapeutic guidance in combination with
sufficient space for experiments and freedom for the patient
that is needed to take responsibility for his or her new de-
velopment. In order to increase free choice the patients must
learn to cope with adverse conditions and circumstances that
easily interfere with it. And the patient must learn a) to be
flexible and have realistic expectation regadring his or her
attempts to change, and b) to practice self-crticism. Rigid
attempts to change will be doomed to fail because they are
characterized by fear; lack of creativity, openess and sub-
tility. The patient should learn to accept and experience the
benefits of percepting, accepting and dealing with reality. As
a consequence the energy-consuming avoidance and rejec-
tion of the fearful side of life might be gradulally dimin-
ish and the patient will experience more energy, power and
self-esteem.
As a result of normalized and increased capacities and
skills new opportunities will occur for social-emotional
awareness/experiences, work or better work and associated
increase of social-economical status (as a consequence of im-
proved behavior, attitude, adjustment and use of capacities)
and development of social relationships.
Discussion
There is some evidence that some categories of psychotic
patients demonstrate at least some degree of free will. Al-
thought there is empirical evidence that psychosis have sig-
nificant cognitive, emotional and neurobiological determi-
nants the precise impact of these abnornalities on free will is
largely unknown. The interaction between personal choice
and (correlates of) psychosis is a complicated one and the
exact nature remains unclear. In order to explain the pre-
cise free choice related determinants of psychotic disorder
following issues should be explored:
 Which environmental, psychosocial, intrapsychic, charac-
terologic, cultural, ethnic, religious, educational and neu-
robiological factors are involved in the psychotic etiology
as well as in the underlying development of free will and
internal locus of control?
 Could psychosis be regarded as an ultimate attempt to
avoid aversive experiences and related depression, stress,
trauma, learned helplessness, serious disappointments,
frustrations, and self-directed anger?
 What are the benefits of psychotic experiences? How could
these benefits be utilzed within and outside therapeutic
context?
More research is needed into a) the role of free will into
psychotic etiology and maintenance and b) the impact of
different categories of psychotic disorder on free will of the
patient.
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